Aphantasia and involuntary imagery.

Aphantasia is a condition that is often characterized as the impaired ability to create voluntary mental images. Aphantasia is assumed to selectively affect voluntary imagery mainly because even though aphantasics report being unable to visualize something at will, many report having visual dreams. We argue that this common characterization of aphantasia is incorrect. Studies on aphantasia are often not clear about whether they are assessing voluntary or involuntary imagery, but some studies show that several forms of involuntary imagery are also affected in aphantasia (including imagery in dreams). We also raise problems for two attempts to show that involuntary images are preserved in aphantasia. In addition, we report the results of a study about afterimages in aphantasia, which suggest that these tend to be less intense in aphantasics than in controls. Involuntary imagery is often treated as a unitary kind that is either present or absent in aphantasia. We suggest that this approach is mistaken and that we should look at different types of involuntary imagery case by case. Doing so reveals no evidence of preserved involuntary imagery in aphantasia. We suggest that a broader characterization of aphantasia, as a deficit in forming mental imagery, whether voluntary or not, is more appropriate. Characterizing aphantasia as a volitional deficit is likely to lead researchers to give incorrect explanations for aphantasia, and to look for the wrong mechanisms underlying it.

Volition motivates cognitive performance at the response-execution level by attenuating task-irrelevant motor activations.

Humans express volition by making voluntary choices which, relative to forced choices, can motivate cognitive performance in a variety of tasks. However, a task that requires the generation of motor responses on the basis of external sensory stimulation involves complex underlying cognitive processes, e.g., pre-response processing, response selection, and response execution. The present study investigated how these underlying processes are facilitated by voluntary choice-making. In five experiments, participants were free or forced to choose a task-irrelevant picture from two alternatives, and then completed a conflict task, i.e., Flanker, Stroop, Simon, Stroop-Simon, or Flanker-Simon task, where the conflict effect could occur at different processing levels. Results consistently showed that responses in all tasks were generally faster after voluntary (vs. forced) choices. Importantly, the conflict effect at the response-execution level (i.e., the Simon effect), but not the conflict effect at the pre-response and response-selection levels (i.e., the Flanker and Stroop effects), was reduced by the voluntary choice-making. Model fitting revealed that the peak amplitude of automatic motor activations in the response-execution conflict was smaller after voluntary (vs. forced) choices. These findings suggest that volition motivates subsequent cognitive performance at the response-execution level by attenuating task-irrelevant motor activations.

The place of Free Will: the freedom of the prisoner.

Debates about the concept of Free Will date back to ancient times. About 40 years ago, Benjamin Libet designed an experiment showing that the conscious intention to move is preceded by a specific pattern of brain activation. His finding suggested that unconscious processes determine our decisions. Libet-style experiments have continued to dominate the debate about Free Will, pushing some authors to argue that the existence of Free Will is a mere illusion. We believe that this dispute is because we often measure Free Will using arbitrary human decisions rather than deliberate actions. After reviewing the definition of Free Will and the related literature, we conclude that the scientific evidence does not disprove the existence of Free Will. However, our will encounters several constraints and limitations that should be considered when evaluating our deeds' personal responsibility.

The benefit of making voluntary choices generalizes across multiple effectors.

It has been shown that cognitive performance could be improved by expressing volition (e.g., making voluntary choices), which necessarily involves the execution of action through a certain effector. However, it is unclear if the benefit of expressing volition can generalize across different effectors. In the present study, participants made a choice between two pictures either voluntarily or forcibly, and subsequently completed a visual search task with the chosen picture as a task-irrelevant background. The effector for choosing a picture could be the hand (pressing a key), foot (pedaling), mouth (commanding), or eye (gazing), whereas the effector for responding to the search target was always the hand. Results showed that participants responded faster and had a more liberal response criterion in the search task after a voluntary choice (vs. a forced choice). Importantly, the improved performance was observed regardless of which effector was used in making the choice, and regardless of whether the effector for making choices was the same as or different from the effector for responding to the search target. Eye-movement data for oculomotor choice showed that the main contributor to the facilitatory effect of voluntary choice was the post-search time in the visual search task (i.e., the time spent on processes after the target was found, such as response selection and execution). These results suggest that the expression of volition may involve the motor control system in which the effector-general, high-level processing of the goal of the voluntary action plays a key role.

'It's satisfying but destructive': A qualitative study on the experience of bedtime procrastination in new career starters.

BACKGROUND: Bedtime procrastination, the volitional delay of going to bed without any external circumstances causing the delay, is linked to multiple indicators of inadequate sleep. Intervening to reduce bedtime procrastination may be an important avenue to improve sleep outcomes, yet the phenomenon remains poorly understood in populations at risk for bedtime procrastination. New career starters, those who have graduated from tertiary education and started a new full-time job within the past 12 months, may be susceptible to problematic bedtime procrastination and are at an opportune time for a 'fresh start' to change behaviour. AIMS: The objectives of this study were to understand how bedtime procrastination is experienced and perceived by new career starters, to identify the enablers and barriers to behaviour change in new career starters and to explore themes for future interventions. MATERIALS & METHODS: Data were collected through in-depth semi-structured interviews with 28 participants. RESULTS: Inductive thematic analysis was used to find seven themes: (1) negative feelings before and during bedtime procrastination; (2) wanting to versus knowing I shouldn't; (3) difficulty falling asleep; (4) influence of automatic processes; (5) consequences of bedtime procrastination; (6) lack of self-control and (7) technology captures late-night attention. Participants emphasised the need for me-time, self-negotiation to continue procrastinating and knowledge of the value of sleep. DISCUSSION & CONCLUSION: Findings suggest that bedtime procrastination involves both reflective and automatic cognitive processes. Future interventions would benefit from a dual-process approach, using cognitive and behavioural techniques to reduce bedtime procrastination.

Libet's legacy: A primer to the neuroscience of volition.

The neuroscience of volition is an emerging subfield of the brain sciences, with hundreds of papers on the role of consciousness in action formation published each year. This makes the state-of-the-art in the discipline poorly accessible to newcomers and difficult to follow even for experts in the field. Here we provide a comprehensive summary of research in this field since its inception that will be useful to both groups. We also discuss important ideas that have received little coverage in the literature so far. We systematically reviewed a set of 2220 publications, with detailed consideration of almost 500 of the most relevant papers. We provide a thorough introduction to the seminal work of Benjamin Libet from the 1960s to 1980s. We also discuss common criticisms of Libet's method, including temporal introspection, the interpretation of the assumed physiological correlates of volition, and various conceptual issues. We conclude with recent advances and potential future directions in the field, highlighting modern methodological approaches to volition, as well as important recent findings.

Autonomous behaviour and the limits of human volition.

Humans and some other animals can autonomously generate action choices that contribute to solving complex problems. However, experimental investigations of the cognitive bases of human autonomy are challenging, because experimental paradigms typically constrain behaviour using controlled contexts, and elicit behaviour by external triggers. In contrast, autonomy and freedom imply unconstrained behaviour initiated by endogenous triggers. Here we propose a new theoretical construct of adaptive autonomy, meaning the capacity to make behavioural choices that are free from constraints of both immediate external triggers and of routine response patterns, but nevertheless show appropriate coordination with the environment. Participants (N = 152) played a competitive game in which they had to choose the right time to act, in the face of an opponent who punished (in separate blocks) either choice biases (such as always responding early), sequential patterns of action timing across trials (such as early, late, early, late…), or predictable action-outcome dependence (such as win-stay, lose-shift). Adaptive autonomy was quantified as the ability to maintain performance when each of these influences on action selection was punished. We found that participants could become free from habitual choices regarding when to act and could also become free from sequential action patterns. However, they were not able to free themselves from influences of action-outcome dependence, even when these resulted in poor performance. These results point to a new concept of autonomous behaviour as flexible adaptation of voluntary action choices in a way that avoids stereotypy. In a sequential analysis, we also demonstrated that participants increased their reliance on belief learning in which they attempt to understand the competitor's beliefs and intentions, when transition bias and reinforcement bias were punished. Taken together, our study points to a cognitive mechanism of adaptive autonomy in which competitive interactions with other agents could promote both social cognition and volition in the form of non-stereotyped action choices.

Effects of a Web-Based Behavioral Activation Intervention on Depressive Symptoms, Activation, Motivation, and Volition: Results of a Randomized Controlled Trial.

INTRODUCTION: Behavioral activation (BA) is effective for the treatment of depression. The Health Action Process Approach (HAPA), which is derived from health psychology, can provide a motivational-volitional framework of BA. OBJECTIVE: This study investigated the efficacy of a HAPA-based internet-delivered BA intervention (iBA; called InterAKTIV) in individuals with depression, also assessing HAPA-based motivational and volitional outcomes. METHODS: In a two-arm randomized controlled efficacy trial with a parallel design, 128 participants with a major depressive episode were randomly allocated to the intervention group (IG; TAU + immediate access to iBA) or control group (CG; TAU + access to iBA after follow-up). The primary outcome of clinician-rated depressive symptoms and secondary outcomes were assessed at baseline (T1), 8 weeks (T2), 6-month after randomization (T3). Data were analyzed on an intention-to-treat basis. RESULTS: Linear mixed model analyses revealed a significant group*time interaction effect on clinician-rated depressive symptoms favoring the IG (F2, 156.0 = 7.40; p < 0.001, d = 0.79 at T2, d = 0.25 at T3). The IG was also superior regarding self-rated depressive symptoms, BA, most motivational, and all volitional outcomes. CONCLUSION: This study shows that HAPA-based iBA can significantly improve clinician-rated depressive symptoms, as well as outcomes used in the HAPA model in people with depression. Building on these efficacy results, in the next step, the relationship between BA interventions and activity levels should be investigated, taking into account motivation and volition as potential mediators.

The neural basis of mental navigation in rats.

A brain-machine interface demonstrates volitional control of hippocampal activity.

Volitional activation of remote place representations with a hippocampal brain-machine interface.

The hippocampus is critical for recollecting and imagining experiences. This is believed to involve voluntarily drawing from hippocampal memory representations of people, events, and places, including maplike representations of familiar environments. However, whether representations in such "cognitive maps" can be volitionally accessed is unknown. We developed a brain-machine interface to test whether rats can do so by controlling their hippocampal activity in a flexible, goal-directed, and model-based manner. We found that rats can efficiently navigate or direct objects to arbitrary goal locations within a virtual reality arena solely by activating and sustaining appropriate hippocampal representations of remote places. This provides insight into the mechanisms underlying episodic memory recall, mental simulation and planning, and imagination and opens up possibilities for high-level neural prosthetics that use hippocampal representations.

Behavioral measurements of motor readiness in mice.

Motor planning facilitates rapid and precise execution of volitional movements. Although motor planning has been classically studied in humans and monkeys, the mouse has become an increasingly popular model system to study neural mechanisms of motor planning. It remains yet untested whether mice and primates share common behavioral features of motor planning. We combined videography and a delayed response task paradigm in an autonomous behavioral system to measure motor planning in non-body-restrained mice. Motor planning resulted in both reaction time (RT) savings and increased movement accuracy, replicating classic effects in primates. We found that motor planning was reflected in task-relevant body features. Both the specific actions prepared and the degree of motor readiness could be read out online during motor planning. The online readout further revealed behavioral evidence of simultaneous preparation for multiple actions under uncertain conditions. These results validate the mouse as a model to study motor planning, demonstrate body feature movements as a powerful real-time readout of motor readiness, and offer behavioral evidence that motor planning can be a parallel process that permits rapid selection of multiple prepared actions.

Control Beliefs Mediate the Within-Person Relationship Between Everyday Activity Volition and Daily Subjective Age.

OBJECTIVES: Appraisal and interpretation of personal experiences resulting from interaction with situational contexts might play an important role in shaping subjective age at the within-person level, but it is unclear how this process unfolds. We propose that older adults evaluate situational contexts and reflect on their general psychological resources when determining their subjective age, and tested this proposal with volition of daily activities as a proxy for appraisal of situational contexts and control beliefs as a proxy for psychological resources. We hypothesize that appraising daily activities one engaged in as obligatory would deplete one's perceived control and concomitantly make one feel older. METHODS: Older adults (n = 116) ranging in age from 60 to 90 (M = 64.84) completed a 9-day daily diary study online, resulting in 743 total days. Participants reported their sociodemographic characteristics on Day 1 and major daily activities, volition of every reported activity, felt age, and control beliefs on Days 2-9. RESULTS: On days when older adults felt that activities they engaged in were of their own volition, they also felt more in control. A lower-level mediation result suggested that within-person control beliefs mediated the relationship between volition of daily activities and subjective age. DISCUSSION: Our findings suggest that older adults evaluate situational contexts and reflect on their control beliefs as a general psychological resource when determining their subjective age. These findings show the important role psychological resources play in determining subjective age from a within-person perspective and extended the within-person process proposed in previous theoretical models.

Implicit bias training can remove bias from subliminal stimuli, restoring choice divergence: A proof-of-concept study.

Subliminal information can influence our conscious life. Subliminal stimuli can influence cognitive tasks, while endogenous subliminal neural information can sway decisions before volition. Are decisions inextricably biased towards subliminal information? Or can they diverge away from subliminal biases via training? We report that implicit bias training can remove biases from subliminal sensory primes. We first show that subliminal stimuli biased an imagery-content decision task. Participants (n = 17) had to choose one of two different patterns to subsequently imagine. Subliminal primes significantly biased decisions towards imagining the primed option. Then, we trained participants (n = 7) to choose the non-primed option, via post choice feedback. This training was successful despite participants being unaware of the purpose or structure of the reward schedule. This implicit bias training persisted up to one week later. Our proof-of-concept study indicates that decisions might not always have to be biased towards non-conscious information, but instead can diverge from subliminal primes through training.

Attention without Constraint: Alpha Lateralization in Uncued Willed Attention.

Studies of voluntary visual spatial attention have used attention-directing cues, such as arrows, to induce or instruct observers to focus selective attention on relevant locations in visual space to detect or discriminate subsequent target stimuli. In everyday vision, however, voluntary attention is influenced by a host of factors, most of which are quite different from the laboratory paradigms that use attention-directing cues. These factors include priming, experience, reward, meaning, motivations, and high-level behavioral goals. Attention that is endogenously directed in the absence of external attention-directing cues has been referred to as "self-initiated attention" or, as in our prior work, as "willed attention" where volunteers decide where to attend in response to a prompt to do so. Here, we used a novel paradigm that eliminated external influences (i.e., attention-directing cues and prompts) about where and/or when spatial attention should be directed. Using machine learning decoding methods, we showed that the well known lateralization of EEG alpha power during spatial attention was also present during purely self-generated attention. By eliminating explicit cues or prompts that affect the allocation of voluntary attention, this work advances our understanding of the neural correlates of attentional control and provides steps toward the development of EEG-based brain-computer interfaces that tap into human intentions.

What is the intention to move and when does it occur?

In 1983 Benjamin Libet and colleagues published a paper apparently challenging the view that the conscious intention to move precedes the brain's preparation for movement. The experiment initiated debates about the nature of intention, the neurophysiology of movement, and philosophical and legal understanding of free will and moral responsibility. Here we review the concept of "conscious intention" and attempts to measure its timing. Scalp electroencephalographic activity prior to movement, the Bereitschaftspotential, clearly begins prior to the reported onset of conscious intent. However, the interpretation of this finding remains controversial. Numerous studies show that the Libet method for determining intent, W time, is not accurate and may be misleading. We conclude that intention has many different aspects, and although we now understand much more about how the brain makes movements, identifying the time of conscious intention is still elusive.

Striosomes and Matrisomes: Scaffolds for Dynamic Coupling of Volition and Action.

Striosomes form neurochemically specialized compartments of the striatum embedded in a large matrix made up of modules called matrisomes. Striosome-matrix architecture is multiplexed with the canonical direct-indirect organization of the striatum. Striosomal functions remain to be fully clarified, but key information is emerging. First, striosomes powerfully innervate nigral dopamine-containing neurons and can completely shut down their activity, with a following rebound excitation. Second, striosomes receive limbic and cognition-related corticostriatal afferents and are dynamically modulated in relation to value-based actions. Third, striosomes are spatially interspersed among matrisomes and interneurons and are influenced by local and global neuromodulatory and oscillatory activities. Fourth, striosomes tune engagement and the motivation to perform reinforcement learning, to manifest stereotypical behaviors, and to navigate valence conflicts and valence discriminations. We suggest that, at an algorithmic level, striosomes could serve as distributed scaffolds to provide formats of the striatal computations generated through development and refined through learning. We propose that striosomes affect subjective states. By transforming corticothalamic and other inputs to the functional formats of the striatum, they could implement state transitions in nigro-striato-nigral circuits to affect bodily and cognitive actions according to internal motives whose functions are compromised in neuropsychiatric conditions.

The Role of Unawareness, Volition, and Neural Hyperconnectivity in Alcohol Use Disorder: A Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Study.

BACKGROUND: Automated alcohol craving and habitual alcohol consumption characterize the later stages of alcohol use disorder (AUD). This study reanalyzed previously collected functional neuroimaging data in combination with the Craving Automated Scale for Alcohol (CAS-A) questionnaire to investigate the neural correlates and brain networks underlying automated drinking characterized by unawareness and nonvolition. METHODS: We assessed 49 abstinent male patients with AUD and 36 male healthy control participants during a functional magnetic resonance imaging-based alcohol cue-reactivity task. We performed whole-brain analyses examining the associations between CAS-A scores and other clinical instruments and neural activation patterns in the alcohol versus neutral contrast. Furthermore, we performed psychophysiological interaction analyses to assess the functional connectivity between predefined seed regions and other brain areas. RESULTS: In patients with AUD, higher CAS-A scores correlated with greater activation in dorsal striatal, pallidal, and prefrontal regions, including frontal white matter, and with lower activation in visual and motor processing regions. Between-group psychophysiological interaction analyses showed extensive connectivity between the seed regions inferior frontal gyrus and angular gyrus and several frontal, parietal, and temporal brain regions in AUD versus healthy control participants. CONCLUSIONS: The present study applied a new lens to previously acquired alcohol cue-reactivity functional magnetic resonance imaging data by correlating neural activation patterns with clinical CAS-A scores to elucidate potential neural correlates of automated alcohol craving and habitual alcohol consumption. Our results support previous findings showing that alcohol addiction is associated with hyperactivation in habit-processing regions, with hypoactivation in areas mediating motor and attention processing, and with general hyperconnectivity.

A frontoparietal network for volitional control of gaze following.

Gaze following is a major element of non-verbal communication and important for successful social interactions. Human gaze following is a fast and almost reflex-like behaviour, yet it can be volitionally controlled and suppressed to some extent if inappropriate or unnecessary, given the social context. In order to identify the neural basis of the cognitive control of gaze following, we carried out an event-related fMRI experiment, in which human subjects' eye movements were tracked while they were exposed to gaze cues in two distinct contexts: A baseline gaze following condition in which subjects were instructed to use gaze cues to shift their attention to a gazed-at spatial target and a control condition in which the subjects were required to ignore the gaze cue and instead to shift their attention to a distinct spatial target to be selected based on a colour mapping rule, requiring the suppression of gaze following. We could identify a suppression-related blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) response in a frontoparietal network comprising dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), the anterior insula, precuneus, and posterior parietal cortex (PPC). These findings suggest that overexcitation of frontoparietal circuits in turn suppressing the gaze following patch might be a potential cause of gaze following deficits in clinical populations.

Sobre a Psicologia em Tomás de Aquino / On Thomas Aquinas's Psychology: An Analysis of the Will in the SummaTheologica

Desde o século XIII, a obra de Tomás de Aquino tem suscitado muitos debates entre filósofos e teólogos. São poucos os psicólogos, contudo, que veem aí alguma relevância para a psicologia contemporânea, embora o pensamento do Aquinate contenha profundas reflexões sobre aspectos da natureza humana que ainda desafiam nossa compreensão. Partindo do pressuposto de que o pensamento medieval pode lançar luz sobre alguns debates psicológicos contemporâneos, o objetivo do presente artigo é duplo: primeiro, queremos mostrar que há uma psicologia genuína em Tomás de Aquino, entendida como scientia de anima; segundo, vamos ilustrar nossa tese por meio da análise de um de seus conceitos centrais, a saber, a vontade. Nossa análise ficará restrita ao âmbito da Suma de Teologia, embora apareçam também algumas menções a outros escritos em que o tópico aparece. Ao final, vamos discutir as implicações desse conceito para a psicologia de Aquino, algumas limitações da presente investigação e possíveis caminhos futuros.

From the XIII century onward, Aquinas's work has been much debated among philosophers and theologians. Not many psychologists, however, see in his work any relevance for contemporary psychology, although Aquinas's system contains profound reflections on some aspects of human nature that still defy our understanding. Assuming that medieval thought can shed some light on contemporary psychological debates, the goal of this paper is twofold: first, wewant to show that there is a genuine psychology in Aquinas's work, understood as scientia de anima; second, we will illustrate our thesis by analyzing one of its central concepts, namely, the will. Our analysis will focus on the Summa Theologica, although Aquinas's other writings will also be mentioned. In the end, we will discuss the implications of this concept for Aquina's psychology, some limits of our present investigation, and potential paths for future research.